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CHINA: A NEW RELATIONSHIP 
Commencement Address by Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana) 
Rocky Mountain College, Billings, Montana 
Monday, May 29, 1972, 9:30a.m., M.S.T. 
I would like to share with you on this day which is 
of great importance to you some thoughts of world affairs. One 
aspect of this subject, in particular, begs for your understanding 
and attention. That is the relationship between the United States 
and China. It is uppermost in my mind, at this time, because I 
have only this month returned from a journey to Peking. The 
i mpressions of the visit to that capital and several other Chinese 
cities are still very vivid. So, too, are my discussions with 
leaders of the People's Republic. 
This is a notable year in U.S.-China relations. The 
first significant steps in 25 years have been taken towards a 
general revi sion of dealings with China. The initiative was 
long overdue and, hence the backlog of unfinished business is 
very heavy. 
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Almost a quarter of a century ago, we cut ourselves 
off, as a matter of deliberate policy, from all normal relations 
with the largest nation on earth. We did so by misreading or 
distorting, in an official sense, the implicat i ons of the Chinese 
revolution which brought a new government to Peking in 1949. 
Thereafter, we acted on the legal pretense that the People's 
Republic of Chi na did not exi st. Even as we pretended it was not 
there, we invested heavi ly in an elaborate system of costly con-
stra i nts to curtail that government. 
The price of this deta chment fr om reality was not 
trivial. Qui te apart from billions spent for counterpoises to 
China throughout Asia, our present i nvolvement in Viet Nam can 
be cons i dered, in large measure, to be pa rt of the pr i ce of this 
c onstra i nt. So, too, was our earl i er involvement in Korea. 
These and other military act ions were undertaken in the 
name of a policy called "containment" which was based on a set of 
assumptions about the nature of events in China, as we guessed or 
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persuaded ourselves to bel i eve them to be. These assumptions were 
made in a vacuum because of our isolation from the Chinese mainland. 
Not surprisingly, many of them turned out to be highly inaccurate. 
The tragic cost of the miscalculations can be stated 
in terms of the lives lost, the bod i es maimed and the resources 
squandered all around the rimlands of Asia, particularly in Korea 
and Indochi na. To be sure, we cannot est imate what the alternative 
costs might have been had we acted on more accurate assumptions, 
or had we taken no action at all . Simpl y on the bas i s of what 
did happen, however, history may well record these miscalculat ions 
regard i ng Chi na, as among the most cost l y of all time. 
I might say, parenthetically, that we are at a cruc ial 
point, at the present time, in determining whether we will pers i st 
i n thi s mistaken course. I refer to events in Viet Nam duri ng 
the past few weeks. The new U. S. air and sea actions are vest igial 
responses which arise from the old, not the new Chi na policy whi ch 
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was signaled by the President's visit to Peking. Whatever the 
success of these new war measures, they will not alter in any 
way the overwhelming need of this nation to disengage completely 
from the Indochina conflict. We need to do so, not to satisfy 
Hanoi or Peking or Moscow, but in order to serve our own national 
interests. If we have learned anything to date from thi s conflict, 
it is that we have no national stake in that conflict except an 
end t o further casualties and the return of the prisoners of war 
and the missing in action. The course of action best calculated 
t o serve these nat i onal needs remains to negotiate the best poli-
tical solution without further recourse to arms and to get out of 
Indochina, lock, stock and barrel. 
But, to return to the central theme of my remarks, it 
is revealing t o ask ourselves how we became involved in Viet Nam 
in the f i rst place. How did we permit ourselves to make such 
faulty commi tments with such disastrous consequences? We get 
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some clues, I think, when we review the spectrum of our relation-
ship wi th China over the last two centuries. 
More than with other nations, our relationship with 
China has been subject t ~ the ebb and flow of popular myth. We 
have tended to oscillate from one oversimplified view of China 
t o another. For almost two centuries, China has been viewed, 
alternately, as benign or virulent, friendly or host i le, wise 
or foolish. 
Like the 11 yin 11 and 11 yang 11 of Chinese cosmology which 
holds that life is the product of a dualism of opposites, our 
image of China has gone from one extreme to the other. On the 
one hand, there has been the image of the China of wisdom, intel-
ligence, i ndustry, pi ety, stoic i sm and strength. That is the 
benign China of Marco Polo and Pearl S. Buck; i t i s the Chi na of 
the Charlie Chan movies and of the stor i es of heroic res i stance 
to Japan in the l930 1 s. 
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On the other hand, there has been the image of the 
China of cruelty, barbarism, violence, and faceless hordes. 
This is the China of drum-head trials, opium dens, bandits, 
summary executions, Fu Manchu, and the Boxer Rebellion. 
In the late 18th century, we looked up to China as an 
anc i ent civilization--superior in many aspects of technology, 
culture, and soc ial order and surrounded by an air of s plend i d 
and imper ial mystery. In that period, the China trade was s ought 
eagerl y by the Clipper ships and Chi nese produce was highly valued 
notab l y along the Eastern Seaboard and in Europe. 
Respect turned to contempt, however, with China's 
quick defeat i n the Opium War of 1840. There followed acts of 
humil iation of China such as our part icipation i n extra-territoria l 
treaty r ights and the Chinese Exclus ion Act of the last ha lf of 
the 19th century. 
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In theearly 20th century, attitudes sh i fted again ta 
benevolence. American missionaries of many faiths made China 
a favored field for proselytizing and education. In this per iod, 
the Chi nese became, far this nation, a guided, guarded, and adored 
people. 
Chinese res i stance ta the Japanese invasion in 1937 
produced another shift from benevolence ta admiration . At the 
end of the Sec ond World War, admiration was displaced by dis-
appointment and frustation, as the wart ime truce between Nat ionalist 
and Communist forces collapsed in internal strife. This nation 
became profoundly disenchanted wi th China, a disenchantment which 
was replaced abruptly in 1949 by hostility. U. S. Secretaries of 
State turned the i r backs on Chinese leaders and spoke of the mehace 
of "Chinese hordes" as predecessors had spoken with similar re-
vulsion of the 11 yellow peril. 11 
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The hostility was largely a react i on, of course, to 
the coming to power of a Communist regime on the Chinese mainland. 
We were not only djsmayed by th i s development, we saw it almost 
as a national affront. Peking was viewed as a treacherous ex-
tension of the Soviet steamroller which had reduced Eastern and 
Central Europe to subservience at the end of World War II. China 
became in our eyes the Eastern puppet of world communism, to be 
manipulated by strings pulled in Moscow. 
After Chi nese forces intervened in the war in Korea 
where, incidentally, Mao Tse-tung lost his eldest son, U. S. 
policy was cast anew on the premise that the government on the 
Chinese mainland was an aggressor. It was seen as ready to use 
force to impose international Communism anywhere in Asia. Con-
versely, it was assumed that if the endorsement of the free nations 
were withheld, thi s reg i me which was said to be "alien" to the 
Chinese people would wither and collapse. 
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On this premise, it was rationalized that recognition 
must not be extended to Peking. Instead, the official American 
view was that the Chinese National Government, which had retreated 
to the island of Taiwan, continued to speak for all of China. We 
cut off trade with the Chinese mainland and did whatever could be 
done to encourage other countries to follow suit. In a similar 
fashion, a diplomatic campaign was conducted year after year 
against the seating of the Chinese People's Republic in the United 
Nations. 
We drew an arc of military alliances on the seaward 
side of Chi na and undergirded them with the deployment of massive 
U. S. military power in bases throughout the Western Pacific. Tens 
of billions of dollars were expended in this process. Much of 
this immense outpouring of effort and money seems incredible now 
in the light of the President's recent visits to Peking and to 
Moscow. Yet, it has continued for 20 years and, of course, is 
still going on, notably, in Indochina. 
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As has been suggested, this last quarter century of 
China policy has been characterized by delusion and miscalculation. 
We assumed, for example, that the Chinese Communists would be unable 
to govern. We assumed that the Peking government would be an ex-
tension of Soviet Communism and a willing accomplice to Soviet 
purpose and design. And we assumed that the Chinese government 
would be bent on territorial aggrandizement. 
All of these assumptions have proved to be erroneous. 
In the first place, of the numerous divisions which have arisen 
within the Communist world, the differences between Moscow and 
Peking have been the most significant. They so remain today 
although the rasping edges of the conflict appear somewhat tempered 
by the periodic flare-ups of the war in Viet Nam. 
At the same time, the government of the People's Republic 
has not only survived, it has provided the Chinese people with 
effective leadership . Chinese society has achieved a considerable 
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degree of economic, scientific and social progress. A modern 
technology has been developed which is sophisticated enough to 
turn out products ranging from needles and hand-tools to thermo-
nuclear devices, earth satellites and the rockets to place them 
in orbit. A powerful national momentum has been generated which 
is proving sufficient to supply an enormous population with the 
wherewithal of decent survival and an improving livelihood. 
Notwithstanding a ssumptions to the contrary, the Chinese 
government has not shown any great eagerness to use its own armed 
forces to spread its control abroad. Where Chinese armies have 
been employed they have been used to assert traditional territorial 
claims, or in expression of concern for the safety of China's 
borders. China has not become enmeshed in foreign military ad-
ventures. In Viet Nam, for example, the Chinese military involve-
ment has been peripheral. There is Chinese equipment in South 
Viet Nam but there are no Chinese battal ions . In North Viet Nam 
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reports have indicated the presence, from time to t ime, not of 
Chinese combat units, but of labor troops engaged in repairing 
bomb damage to roads, railroads, bridges and the like. 
Chinese actions in Tibet, and along the Himalayan 
frontier with India, are often cited as examples of militant 
Communist aggression. Nevertheless, for centur j_es, Tibet has 
been universally regarded as falling within China's over-all 
boundaries. If the Peking government claims that Tibet belongs 
to Ch na, so, too, does the Chinese Nat ional Government on Taiwan. 
India also acknowledges such to be the case and American policy 
has never officially recognized Tibet as other than Chinese 
territory. 
Even in Korea, the direct Chi nese military involvement 
di d not begin until United Nat i ons forces approached Chi na's 
borders. In any event, the last Chinese batallions left North 
Korea years ago. 
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Looking ahead, it would seem to me that Chinese energies 
and resources are going t o be so preempted by internal needs over 
the next two decades that there is l i ttle likelihood that Chi na 
could post a serious military danger t o the United States even if 
that were the inclination. 
The evidence, in short, is ample to dispel some of the 
most ala rming assumptions on which our past policies have been 
based . Of course, there is an immense potential danger in China. 
There is also an immense potential danger in every other powerful 
nat ion in a world whi ch has not yet learned how to maintain 
c i vilized survival in a nuclear age except on the razor's edge. 
Insofar as Chi na i s concerned, the fundamenta l question for us 
is not so much whether it is a danger, but whether our policies 
wil l act t o alleviate or to exacerbate the danger. 
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In my judgment, these policies can alleviate the danger 
only to the extent that they are based on premises that correspond 
more nearly to realities than has been the case in the past. It 
will serve no useful purpose to flail at windmills . Now that we 
have, in 1972, at last penetrated the shroud of ~bscurity surround-
i ng China, there is reason to hope that our judgments and actions 
regarding China and Asia, henceforth, will be better informed. 
In th i s new phase of our relat ions with China, we must 
beware, of course, that the old pendulum of myth does not now 
swing to the other extreme, thereby creating a new image of China 
whic h is as unreal as the old. We must guard against becomi ng too 
enamoured of the splendors of a newly rev ived amity. Banquets 
and toasts and shark's fin soup do no t of themselves assure a new 
order of world affairs . 
To keep the pendulum in equilibrium in our current ap-
proach to China, it would be well to heed a rule laid down by 
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Lord Palmerst~n, the prime Minister of Great Britain in the 
1860's, who declared: 
"We have no eternal allies, and we 
have no perpetual enemies. " 
Our experiences in postwar World War II relations with Germany 
and Japan underscore this observation. 
We have not always been very astute about defining 
where our real interests lie . We have often tended to confuse 
them with fleeting and transitory images of friendliness or 
animosity . This is all too true in the case of China where, for 
25 years, we have been obsessed with the assumed threat of a per-
petual enemy. In fact, we might well have avoided the untold 
misery and loss of life and resources of the peripheral war in 
Indochina, had we forgone the poses of power and, instead, taken 
a harder view of our national interests. 
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While we cannot identify national interests with exacti-
tude, we do have it wi thin our means to determine much more clearly 
where it is that they do not lie. The President has shown the way 
in th~ s connection. Even before his visit to Peking, he had laid 
the groundwork for reestablishing more normal contact with the 
People's Republic of China by the removal of discriminatory restric-
tion on travel of Americans to the Chinese mainland and by ending 
the embargo on trade with China. The embargo had been imposed 
during the Korean War and was of a design so tight as to exclude 
even chop-sticks . The fact is, however, that for two decades, it 
had had no economic impact on Chi na and had served only to injure 
our own traders. By ending the boycott on the eve of his visit 
China 
to China, the President removed what was, at most, an irritant to I 
but which would have hampered his efforts to br i ng about the 
beginni ngs of a reconciliation. 
As it was, President Nixon was able to lay the groundwork 
for the growth of contact between the two nations. The chances 
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are good that the months and years ahead will see a gradual increase 
in exchanges between China and the United States in medicine and 
health, science, j ournal ism, athleti~s, the arts and other pursuits . 
An increase in trade i s also to be anticipated . The 
Chinese are in an excellent position to move forward in this connec-
tion. It has been their practice to keep imports and exports, world -
wide, in rough balance . They have neither external nor internal 
debt. They have ample exchange r eserves . Their international re -
putat i on for integrity and reliability in commercial transati.ons 
is already very good. A great range of Chinese products is avail -
able for sale in the world markets a nd the Chinese also have a 
substantial shopping list for imports which will help to speed 
their own development and strengthen their economic self-reliance . 
Exchanges can take place, in my judgment, even though 
the issue of Taiwan remains, f i nal l y, to be r esolved . Pres i dent 
Nixon has acknowledged as valid, Peking's claim that the island 
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i s part of China. That claim, incidentally) is susta i ned by the 
Ch i nese government on Taiwan. With the assur ance that the Un i ted 
States wi ll not pursue a two-Chi na policy) Peki ng i s prepared to 
go ahead i n ree stab l ishing contact wi th this nat ion wh1le exploring 
in i ts own fas hi on t he road to reunif ; cat t on of the i sla nd wi th 
the ma i nland. 
Beyond exchanges between Chi na and the Un i ted States) 
there l oom la r ger quest ions of peace and security in the Western 
Pac ific. Even as we meet here t oday, weawa i t the consequences 
of the l a test esca la t 5on of the U. S. i nvolvement i n Vi et Nam as 
well as the ful l import of the Pres i dent's d i scuss i ons i n Moscow. 
One can only ho pe t hat we have seen the last resort t o retal i at ion 
in Indochina , the f i na l burst of th i s wasting conflict and that 
progress can now be expected toward a genui ne political settlement. 
In all candor) the recor d of this tragic wa r prov i des 
little grounds f a r opt i mi sm in th i s respect . The i nvas i on of 
Cambodia di d not produce peace . Nor d i d the invasion of Laos. 
Nor d i d the earlier bomb ing enterpr i ses over North Vi et Nam. 
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Peace was the promise attached, in turn, to each of 
these escalat ions of the U. S. involvement . Each, in turn, led 
not to the promised peace but to -.a more ki lled and maimed, more 
prisoners of war, more missing in act ion, more and more billions 
in expenditures to produce more and more devastation throughout 
Indochina. 
The end of this war has yet to come and it is not clear 
yet when i t will come. We would do well , nevertheless, to begin 
to exa5ine the pos s i bilit i es of a new secur i ty system, based on 
the real~t ie s of the 70's . Those reali t i es urge us to seek, in 
my judgment, an equilibrium of this nat ion's interests with those 
of China, J apan, the Soviet Union and the smaller nations of the 
Western Pacific . All have a stake i n the peace of the region. 
The restorat ion of contact with China furthers the 
poss i bility that at some time tr ipart ite discuss ions might be 
held between China, J apan, and the United States, if not quadr i -
part i te talks, whic h would also include the Soviet Union . A 
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development of this kind could do much to allay unfounded mutual 
fears and to begin to come to grips with the question of adjustment 
of valid nat ional interests. It could provide insights into such 
vital questi Jns as the intentions of the various powers i n the 
Western Pacif i c and how they relate to one another, the economic 
needs of the Asian nations, and the prospects for curbing nuclear 
conflict. Most i mportant, such discuss· ons might provi de a vehicle 
for genera l stabilizat i on of the Indoch~na peninsul a and Southeast 
Asia in the post-war era. 
Adjustments of th i s kind requi re fresh perspectives. 
We need t o see the s i tuat i on as i t is t oday, ndas it appeared 20 
years ago i n the cataclysmic upheaval of the Chi nese revolution. 
We need to see the situation not through the fog of an old and 
stagnant host. lity but i n the l i ght o f the enduring interests of 
the Un i ted States i n the Western Pac i fic whi ch are no less than a 
peace of equality and mutua l ity whl ch wi ll permi t a flowering of 
relat i ons with all Asian nations. Nor, may I add, are they any 
more. 
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I see great relevance in young men and women thinking 
deeply of the i s sues wh j_ch d i vide China and the United States to 
determine how they can be recast in new and uncluttered molds. 
Unl i~e my generation, you have already learned much about As i a . 
You have a greater awareness of its importance to this nation 
and t ~ the w~rld. Furthermore, you have not had the experience 
~f nati ~nal trauma in moving abruptly fr~m an era marked by an 
almost fawning benevolence t oward China to one of thorough di.s-
enchantment. You were spared the fierce hostilities which rent 
this nat ion i nternally, as a sense of warmth, sympathy, and secur i ty 
regarding China gave way to fee lings of revul sion, hatred and in-
security. 
Y::m young Americans and y:mr counterparts in Chi na wi_ll 
live your ad ult years i n an era in wh 1 ch much of the world's 
h 1 story will be written in the Pa ~tf ic . WhRt you do , how you 
relate t o one another--Chinese and Ame r icans- - will have much to 
do with whether ~r n~t that h i.story is wr i tten in terms of peace 
and civilized human survjval. 
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I have seen China off and on since I served there in the 
Marines in the 1920's. I have seen you, your parents and your 
grandparents much closer up and for a much longer period of time. 
I am confident about a future that belongs to your 
generation, both in China and in this country of ours. This 
Republic is worthy of your best efforts not only in terms of 
developing Chinese and U. S. relations, but w1 th regard to the 
entire world. You can do no more than try to achieve mutual 
understanding and a peace with all peoples. You can and should 
do no less. 
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